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D'Esposito, 2009; Koechlin and Summerfield, 2007 ; but see Duncan, 2010 for a dissenting view).
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It has long been recognised that behaviour is hierarchically structured, with high-level plans (e.g.,
177
get to work on time) comprised of sub-routines (e.g., make breakfast, pack a bag, walk to the 178 office) that themselves involve lower-level sub-routines (e.g., make coffee, toast bread). These 179 abstraction hierarchies nearly always exhibit a sequential structure, such that sub-routines are 180 executed in a natural or necessary ordering at each level of the hierarchy. As such, action selection 181 can be characterised in terms of activation flow in a hierarchy from the high-level plan down to 182 the particular sequences of concrete actions that are ultimately specified for execution (Lashley, 183 1951; Miller, Galanter, and Pribram, 1960) . of simple stimulus-response associations rather than high-level task sets. Moreover, feedback in 224 these studies is typically used to indicate whether the subject produced the required response to 225 the imperative stimulus, rather than being a meaningful consequence of the particular action 226 produced.
227
In stark contrast, in almost all complex everyday behaviours, our actions are instrumentally 228 directed towards achieving certain desired outcomes or producing specific changes in the 229 environment. Thus, successful completion of an action is typically defined in terms of bringing 230 about its desired outcome, not in terms of its execution per se (i.e., we define success in terms of 231 ends not means). Success is a light turning on rather than a switch being flicked, a hot cup of 232 coffee in our hands rather than completion of pouring and stirring actions, a draft manuscript 233 rather than a long sequence of keypresses. Action outcomes of this sort have no obvious correlate 234 in many cognitive control tasks, for which action execution marks the end of the trial and in which 235 feedback is often not provided (and, when provided, may be unnecessary except during the earliest 236 stages of practice; Holroyd and Coles, 2002) . As such, previous research on cognitive control may 237 have neglected a critical route by which tasks and actions are selected, that is, through the 238 outcomes they are intended to achieve.
239
A second key feature of everyday action that is missing from standard cognitive control 240 paradigms is sequential structure. With a few notable exceptions (e.g., Schneider and Logan, 241 2006), these paradigms involve a series of discrete trials in which no explicit structure governs the 242 relationship between successive events. Indeed, the most common approach is to deliberately 243 randomise the order of presented stimuli and required tasks and responses (Richter and Yeung, 244 2014). This design choice is true even for paradigms that notionally tap hierarchical behavioural 245 structure (e.g., Koechlin, Ody, and Kouneiher, 2003) . As such, these paradigms share little in 246 common with everyday behaviour which, as already noted above, is characterised by hierarchical 247 and sequential structure: Plans at a given level of abstraction typically comprise a series of sub-248 routines for which the order is at least somewhat constrained (e.g., in my morning routine, I must 249 get out of bed before I can make coffee or shower, but the order of the latter two sub-routines can 250 be exchanged; Botvinick and Plaut, 2004 (Holroyd and Yeung, 2012 ). This is not to say, however, that there has been no research on the 260 outcome-driven, sequential nature of behaviour; indeed this has been a major focus of research, 261 albeit largely separate from the work reviewed above. It is to this research that we now turn. 
Action effects

266
Actions typically have sensory consequences: some that are intrinsic to the intended goal (e.g., a 267 light turning on at the flick of a switch), some that are intrinsic to the action itself (e.g., the 268 proprioceptive consequences of finger flexion), and some that are incidental but nevertheless 269 consistently associated (e.g., the auditory click of the switch). A large corpus of findings has 270 documented the formation of associations between actions and these sensory consequences (James, 1890; Prinz, 1990; Greenwald, 1970; Hommel, 2009 consequences (e.g., pressing a key produces a low-frequency tone), presentation of those
278
'consequences' prior to action selection biases action selection toward the associated action 279 (Elsner and Hommel, 2001 ).
280
The acquisition and maintenance of functional representations necessitate not only the 281 ability to predict which action leads to which outcome, but also the ability to assess whether 282 events and outcomes concur with original predictions. This mechanism of prediction and 283 evaluation is reminiscent of forward models in motor control (Blakemore and Sirigu, 2003;  284 Wolpert and Miall, 1996; Wolpert and Kawato, 1998) . In these models, every mismatch between 285 predicted and actual sensory feedback is indicative of an error and hence the need for adjustment.
286
These forward models can also usefully be run offline, without actual movement. Kawato, 1998) . There is ample evidence for neural activity corresponding to such outcome-292 centred routines of prediction, evaluation, and adjustment in motor control (Tunik, Houk, and 293 Grafton, 2009).
294
However, this research has to date made limited contact with studies of cognitive control.
295
In the present context, the critical missing conceptual link is the idea that action-effect predictions 296 ought to depend on the overarching task goal in two key respects. First, as noted above, some 297 sensory consequences are intrinsic to the action whereas others are incidental, and we might 298 expect differential processing of these even if the action-effect correlations are equivalent. There 299 is some evidence on this point (e.g., Krigolson and Holroyd, 2006 ), but little systematic study.
300
Second, predictions ought to be task-dependent. For example, the same action (e.g., a flick of Montague, 1997; Schultz, 2007) . To refer back to our example, on another foraging trip a week 334 later, finding food at the gas station would not be such a large positive surprise, but finding the gas 335 station to be closed might prompt disappointment (negative prediction error).
336
The aim in RL is to choose the action that will lead to the highest expectation of future 337 reward (discounted for time-to-reward). The underlying routine can be understood as a constant 
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Options are associated with probable end-states, which can be conceived of as subgoals.
364
Subgoals are anticipated outcomes, but not necessarily primary rewards: They can be states that 365 allow the selection of other actions that will ultimately deliver reward. This feature is of great 366 relevance. As discussed previously, we choose actions to achieve desired outcomes, which in 367 everyday life may not necessarily be primary rewards. If we start the day by choosing to go into 368 work to teach a class, arriving at work is an important subgoal that informs us we are on the right above. There, we noted that this research has adopted a narrow conception of 'goals' that does not 396 capture the intuitive notion that goals fundamentally relate to states of the world brought about by 397 our actions, and that it relatedly fails to capture the idea that human behaviour is intrinsically 489 We propose that cognitive control in sequential goal-directed actions is subserved by cortico-basal 
Prediction in cortico-basal ganglia-thalamo-cortical loops
498
A first criterion for a neural structure that can function as a sequential predictive action 499 control system is the capacity to integrate input from a wide range of cortical areas, for example 500 from sensory, motor, and multimodal association cortices. In fact, the striatum as the input 
527
The proposed predictive control system incorporates the characteristic of sequentiality con- 1998; Flaherty and Graybiel, 1991; Flaherty and Graybiel, 1993) . This physiological property of 539 projections to the striatum may provide neural templates (Graybiel, 1998) 
542
On a more general level, these forward models can be described as the association of a known as chunks (Graybiel, 2008; 1998a) . This functional description and terminology 549 dovetails with the concepts of chunks in HRL, denoting an action sequence that can be treated as 550 an entity.
551
A third condition for a system that selects sequential (chunked) action is that predictions of 
566
A fourth criterion for a control system of sequential actions is the ability to detect 567 deviations from intended sequences and signal these deviations to allow behavioural adjustments.
568
An emerging view is that the basal ganglia are involved in selecting action sequences (Graybiel, 
Probabilistic selection in basal ganglia pathways
581
The ability to select appropriate actions to achieve internal goals is fundamental to cognitive (Graybiel, 1998) .
645
As we will see, recent descriptions of basal ganglia connectivity (Haber, 
694
In contrast to this role for OFC, the dlPFC has been associated with representation of rules not show predictive strategies in motor tasks (Crawford et al., 1989; Flowers, 1978 
802
Although these studies emphasise the association between actions and outcomes, they typically do 803 not report a benefit of outcome predictability at the selection stage (Band et 
830
One study showing that selection of simple actions benefits from the presence of 831 contingent outcomes was reported by Ziessler and colleagues (2012) . This study found a 832 behavioural benefit of a match between an imperative stimulus and an action effect, using object 833 and grip-type affordances as 'go' stimuli and sensory effects in a go/no-go paradigm (Ziessler, 834 Nattkemper, and Vogt, 2012). When images of objects were used as stimuli, actions were 835 performed faster if pictures of object-compatible grip types served as the action effect. The same 836 effect was established when grip types were used as 'go' stimuli and compatible objects as action 837 effects. This paradigm thereby exploits overlearned associations between objects and grip types. 
859
Within the framework we present, these effects can be explained by the fact that in all abstraction, but updating is required when switching between stimulus-response mappings. To 875 return to our initial example: on return visits to different countries we do not need to retrace our 876 steps along specific routes to buy dinner; instead, we are able to acquire, select, and switch 877 fluently between different situation-specific options for achieving a particular overarching goal, 878 such as choosing to buy food at a gas station in one country versus a convenience store in another. 
